Where Are We Today In The International Fight Against Overseas Corruption: An Historical Perspective, And Two Problems Going Forward by Davis, Frederick T.
WHERE ARE WE TODAY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST OVERSEAS
CORRUPTION: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 
AND TWO PROBLEMS GOING FORWARD
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The goal of my comments is to take a step back and begin with an
historical perspective on the collective, international effort to fight 
corruption, and then to suggest two problems that effort faces today.  One 
of those problems is fairly obvious and much-discussed: some countries do 
much more than others to fight overseas bribery.  The other is less obvious:
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) could do more to encourage 
robust international, collaborative efforts by being clearer on when it will 
recognize, and defer to, the outcomes of criminal investigations overseas.
To begin with a bit of history:
The relevant history began with the 1977 adoption of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1 in the aftermath of Watergate; before that,
making a bribe to an official in another country was generally tolerated, and 
no comprehensive legislation prohibited it.2 For roughly twenty years the 
FCPA went largely unenforced by the DOJ.3 It is clear why: as originally 
adopted, as a practical matter it applied only to U.S. corporations and 
persons; it was commonly viewed as singling them out and putting them at 
a competitive disadvantage against non-U.S. multinationals that remained 
free from the risk of prosecution, and even benefited from a tax deduction 
for overseas bribes.
The turning point was the adoption of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention)4 in 1997.  Now signed by forty-one nations, its clear purpose 
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was to create a “level playing field” by obligating its signatory nations to 
adopt laws similar to the FCPA, and to enforce them.  The real history of 
FCPA enforcement began with the implementation of the OECD 
Convention in roughly 2000; DOJ investigations since that date have 
steadily increased, with fines well into the billions of dollars having been 
paid to federal and state treasuries.5 Along the way, a virtual “cottage 
industry” of lawyers and other professionals specializing in FCPA 
investigations has developed.6
Viewed from the perspective of the OECD Convention and its core 
purpose, two significant problems exist today that inhibit the “level playing 
field” goal.  
The first is simply that some countries have been more aggressive, 
effective, and successful in implementing their anti-bribery laws than
others.  This problem was not unforeseen.  The OECD was mindful that 
simply adopting legislation conforming to OECD Convention prerequisites 
was not enough, and that robust—and essentially comparable—
enforcement was key.7 To this end, it has done periodic reviews of its 
signatory nations’ enforcement efforts, and publishes country-by-country 
reviews, available online.8 International Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), such as Transparency International, also publish data and 
commentary comparing relative national success in prosecuting overseas 
bribery.9
One of the countries that has done relatively badly is France10: while 
it adopted legislation that prohibits overseas bribery in 2000, since then, not 
a single corporation has been convicted of that crime.11 There are a number 
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of theories as to why this is the case, on which I12 and others13 have written.  
While there may be issues of political will to prosecute acts that were 
relatively recently encouraged by means of a tax deduction, there are also a 
number of curious procedural impediments and disincentives to French 
prosecutions.14 But France is not alone, as the OECD and NGO reports 
point out.15
Failure to contribute to a “level playing field” despite binding treaty 
obligations to do so is obviously unacceptable. In the case of France, U.S.
prosecuting authorities have reacted by energetically pursuing French 
companies that they deemed subject to U.S. prosecutorial power because of 
those companies’ “presence” in the United States: either through 
maintaining U.S. subsidiaries, because some part of the nefarious activities 
took place on U.S. soil, or perhaps because U.S. dollars were involved.16
Four very large, well-known companies—viewed as “national economic 
champions” in France—have entered guilty pleas and/or Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) with U.S. authorities, and have paid in 
total well over U.S. $2 billion to U.S. treasuries.17 All four of them could 
have been and, in my opinion should have been, prosecuted in France.
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This has not gone unnoticed in France. Clearly as a result of U.S.
pressure via such prosecutions, in December 2016 France adopted the “Loi 
Sapin II,” which progressively goes into effect during 2017.18 This law 
attempts to reinforce French efforts to combat overseas bribery by creating 
a new agency tasked with leading this effort, by creating a new obligation 
for French companies to have a compliance program meeting certain 
standards, by enhancing whistleblower protections, and—most 
controversially—by adopting a sort of DPA, which has never existed in 
French criminal procedures.19 Whether these reforms will create results 
deemed sufficient by U.S. prosecutors and the world community remains 
unclear.20
The second problem I will identify is less obvious, but is also 
important and is linked to the first: Non-U.S. efforts to prosecute overseas 
bribery are hampered by the absence of clear, credible statements from U.S.
prosecutors that they will desist from prosecuting if a local prosecutor does 
so in good faith. Article 4.3 of the OECD Convention provides that in the 
event of multiple investigations of the same conduct, the countries involved 
should coordinate to determine “the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution,”21 clearly envisioning that such a prosecution would be single 
and not multiple.  This has not happened, but rather two scenarios occur 
rather frequently.  First, outcomes in one country—including negotiated 
ones—are sometimes followed by a “me too” prosecution in another.22
And second, multinationals facing multiple prosecutors often reach 
separate, sometimes but not always coordinated, agreements with each.23
This matters because of the baleful, disruptive effect a U.S.
prosecution has on efforts elsewhere.  Simply put, U.S. prosecutors have 
powers that most of their European counterparts can only dream of:
unfettered discretion, virtual absence of judicial control over investigations 
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and negotiated outcomes,24 expansive views of their extraterritorial 
powers25 coupled with the fact that more than eighty percent of 
international business deals are denominated in U.S. dollars, very helpful 
laws on corporate criminal responsibility,26 the risk of huge corporate 
penalties and the ability to cumulate such penalties, investigations that last 
months rather than multiple years, powers of evidence-gathering from 
which corporations are virtually helpless in shielding incriminating 
information, virtual freedom from any double jeopardy/ne bis in idem
constraints,27 and flexible procedures such as DPAs and NPAs—all enable 
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them to move more quickly, and to strike far more terror into the hearts of 
corporate decision-makers, than can European prosecutors.  As a result, my 
strong sense from speaking with prosecutors, defense lawyers, and 
corporate counsel in France is that if a company feels it faces the risk of 
U.S. as well as French prosecution, it will focus its efforts on dealing with 
the U.S. risk in the first instance, and assume that French prosecutors will 
fall into place later. In essence, as I have put it elsewhere, the U.S. is 
positioned as the “ultimate arbiter” on the sufficiency of bribery 
prosecutions around the world28—as well as the recipient of billions of 
dollars of criminal and administrative fines, and other payments, made on 
the basis of such prosecutions.
This situation could lead to trouble.  The “level playing field” that the 
OECD Convention envisioned was not only a world in which companies of 
all nationalities faced the same prohibitions and comparable risks of 
prosecution, but in which prosecutors would have an equal say in outcomes.  
Given the relative ineffectiveness of many countries’ efforts, the fact that 
the U.S. prosecutors have attempted to fill this gap is neither surprising nor, 
in itself, wrong.  But there are already indications of resentment in France, 
perhaps in other countries as well; a recent article in two mainstream 
national publications29 referred to U.S. prosecutions of French companies as 
a “big racket” designed to make money for U.S. treasuries and to protect 
U.S. companies, and legislators in the National Assembly are gathering 
information in an apparent effort to combat this situation, including the 
possibility of retaliation.30
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Without slowing their efforts to prosecute overseas corruption, U.S.
prosecutors could do more to emphasize unambiguously that they will 
respect non-U.S. outcomes that are resolved in good faith and on an 
appropriate basis, and to articulate the criteria they use to determine the 
appropriateness or sufficiency of those outcomes.  In recent months, senior 
DOJ officials have emphasized their willingness to work with their 
counterparts abroad, and apparently believe that those efforts are fruitful.31
However, when asked in public conferences what criteria they use to 
evaluate non-U.S. outcomes, their publicly available responses are vague.32
The DOJ issues careful and detailed “guidelines” on many aspects of their 
discretionary authority to charge offenses, but no such guidelines address 
the weight they will give to non-U.S. outcomes, or procedures 
multinationals should follow in that situation.  And the DOJ’s recent track 
record is unclear.  In 2014, the Dutch offshore giant SBM Offshore (SBM),
which had announced in 2012 that it was under investigation by the DOJ,
negotiated an outcome with Dutch authorities, followed immediately by a 
DOJ decision not to prosecute.33 This gave heart to the prospect of 
deference to non-U.S. outcomes and perhaps unsurprisingly led to an 
immediate surge in the value of SBM’s shares in the marketplace, reflecting 
the immense monetary cost of the mere fact of being investigated by U.S.
prosecutors.34 More recently, in the Vimpelcom35 and the Embraer36
matters, the DOJ did not defer to non-U.S. prosecutions but rather shared 
the penalty payments (on a roughly 50/50 basis in the first, roughly 80/20 in 
favor of the U.S. in the second) with their counterparts.  In the four 
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principal FCPA outcomes negotiated between U.S. authorities and French 
companies, involving Total, Technip, Alcatel, and Alstom, the DOJ
sometimes praised their French counterparts for their “cooperation,” but did 
not share a single dollar of the more than $2 billion paid in fines and 
forfeitures.37 If those striking distinctions in outcome were based on 
principles, the principles are certainly not apparent.  But unless the DOJ
does more to recognize the sovereign concerns of its trading partners—
whether by deferring to their prosecutions, or at a minimum sharing the 
proceeds, and making clear the principles it follows in doing so—it risks 
inhibiting those partners’ efforts and creating tensions with them.38
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